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Abstract
We show that the imperceptibility of sev-
eral existing linguistic steganographic systems
(Fang et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2018) re-
lies on implicit assumptions on statistical be-
haviors of fluent text. We formally analyze
them and empirically evaluate these assump-
tions. Furthermore, based on these obser-
vations, we propose an encoding algorithm
called patient-Huffman with improved
near-imperceptible guarantees.
1 Introduction
In recent years, we see many exciting develop-
ments in applied machine learning and, in partic-
ular, its application in the fundamental problem of
language modeling (Sutskever et al., 2011; Joze-
fowicz et al., 2016) in the field of natural language
processing (NLP). However, these advancements
can be exploited by computationally resourceful
entities such as a surveillance state to effectively
monitor its citizens’ ostensibly private communi-
cations at scale.
We are motivated to study the communication
privacy problem of concealing sensitive messages
in monitored channels. In order to avoid rais-
ing suspicion in the monitoring party, we want to
hide the intended message inside a fluent message,
known as a stegotext, indistinguishable from what
is expected in such channels. This is a problem
studied primarily in steganography and steganog-
raphy researchers have a keen interest in linguis-
tic steganography as it presents fundamental chal-
lenges (Chang and Clark, 2014); the linguistic
channel carries few bits per symbol on average
(Shannon, 1951; Brown et al., 1992) making it
hard to hide a message. In contrast, images and
sound recordings have a high information theo-
retic entropy comparing to a written message mak-
ing it relatively easy to embed a message in the
noise floor of the channel.
This problem of hiding secret messages in plain
sight might evoke spy stories of concealing mes-
sages on newspaper advertisements during Cold
War. Such manual methods have been superseded
by algorithmic approaches. Classic methods prior
to the advance of applied machine learning in
this domain typically try to produce grammatical
English with generative grammar (Chapman and
Davida, 1997). However, such generation meth-
ods fall short in terms of statistical imperceptibil-
ity (Meng et al., 2008). This makes them vulnera-
ble to automated detection. Generating fluent1 text
at scale is at the heart of the steganography prob-
lem, and language models (LM) studied in NLP
provide a natural solution by letting us draw sam-
ples of fluent texts.
At the working heart of a LM-based stegosys-
tem, there lies an encoding algorithm that en-
codes a ciphertext (a random string indistinguish-
able from a series of fair coin flips) into a fluent
stegotext using an LM. From the communication
standpoint, this encoding must be uniquely decod-
able, i.e. different ciphertext are encoded into dif-
ferent stegotexts otherwise the receiver will not
be able to decode and recover the ciphertext. In-
stead of sampling according to the LM, an en-
coding algorithm effectively induces a new lan-
guage model by providing a non-standard way to
draw samples from the LM. Thus, from the lan-
guage modeling standpoint, in order to achieve
statistical imperceptibility, extra care is needed
to ensure the resulting LM is close to the orig-
inal LM (Sec. 2.2). Various uniquely decod-
able algorithms has been devised by recent pi-
oneering works (Fang et al., 2017; Yang et al.,
2018) leveraging recurrent neural network-based
LMs, and the high-quality stegotexts generated
show tremendous promise in terms of both flu-
1It is often referred to as “naturalness” in linguistic
steganography literature.
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ency and information hiding capacity. However,
these methods do not explicitly provide guarantees
on imperceptibility. Instead, their imperceptibil-
ity, as we will argue, relies on implicit assump-
tions on the statistical behaviors of the underly-
ing LM, and ultimately, of fluent texts (Sec. 3).
We will empirically evaluate these assumptions
and show that they are problematic (Sec. 3.1). In
response, we will propose an improved encod-
ing algorithm patient-Huffman that explic-
itly maintains imperceptibility (Sec. 3.3).
To see that imperceptibility crucially depends
on the statistics of fluent texts, consider plausi-
ble continuations of the following two prefixes,
“I like your” and “It is on top.” In the first case,
there are many likely next words such as “work”,
“style”, “idea”, “game”, “book”, whereas in the
latter, there are few such as “of”, “,”, “and”, “.”
with “of” being overwhelmingly likely. Intuitively
speaking, the distribution over next tokens in flu-
ent texts is sometimes uniform and sometimes
highly concentrated.2 When it is concentrated, if
we choose the next token by flipping fair coins, we
will be sampling from a very different distribution
and risk being detected after a few samples. In
patient-Huffman, we actively evaluate how
different the encoding distribution and the LM dis-
tribution are, and avoid encoding at steps that can
expose us.
The highlights of this work are the following:
• We quantify statistical imperceptibility with
total variation distance (TVD) between lan-
guage models. We study the TVD of sev-
eral encoding algorithms and point out the
implicit assumption for them to be near-
imperceptible.
• We use a state-of-the-art transformer-based,
subword-level LM, GPT-2-117M (Radford
et al., 2019), to empirically evaluate the plau-
sibility of assumptions implicitly made by
different encoding methods.
• We propose an encoding algorithm
patient-Huffman with strong rela-
tive statistical imperceptibility.
2 Formalism
Suppose Alice (sender) wants to send Bob (re-
ceiver) a sensitive message (plaintext) through a
2Under the estimates of GPT-2-117M, the first continua-
tion has entropy of 11.2 bits and the latter, 0.43 bits. The most
likely next tokens shown are also drawn from this model.
channel monitored by Eve (adversary). This chan-
nel may be shared by many other communicat-
ing parties. Furthermore, Eve expects to see flu-
ent natural language texts in this channel. Alice
wants to avoid sending non-fluent texts through
this channel to raise Eve’s suspicion while ensur-
ing that only Bob can read the sensitive message.
One class of solutions is to
1. Alice encrypts the plaintext message into a
ciphertext with a key shared with Bob.3
2. Alice hides the ciphertext, which has the
statistics of random coin flips, into a fluent
stegotext.
3. Alice sends the stegotext through a channel
monitored by Eve.
4. Bob receives the stegotext and seeks the ci-
phertext from it.
5. Bob decrypts the ciphertext with the shared
key and obtain the plaintext message.
Linguistic stegosystems concern with steps 2
(hide) and 4 (seek), i.e. encoding a random bit-
string into a fluent stegotext and extracting the
original bitstring from such fluent stegotexts, re-
spectively.
A vocabulary Σ of size V is a finite set of to-
kens.4 An extended vocabulary Σ∗ is the set of
all finite sequences of tokens from Σ. We call
its elements texts. A language model ` is a mea-
sure over some extended vocabulary Σ∗. Further-
more, we assume that we have access to the condi-
tional distribution over the next token given a pre-
fix P[st+1|s1 · · · st; `] and the distribution of the
initial token P[s1; `]. An LM specified in this way
allows us to draw samples easily. We can draw a
sample text by drawing each st one at a time for
t = 1, 2, · · · according to LM. We call the random
sample text s := s1 · · · sT ∼ ` an `-fluent text.
Total variation distance (TVD) between two
measures p and q over the same events denoted by
σ-algebra F , is d(p, q) := supE∈F |p(E)− q(E)|
(see A.1 for more facts).
A ciphertext b of length C is a random variable
b := b1b2 · · · bC ∼ Bernoulli(1/2)C . An encoding
algorithm A` is an injective map from ciphertexts
3Public key encryption can also work. Alice will encrypt
the plaintext with Bob’s public key and Bob decrypts with his
private key in that case.
4Tokens can be characters, subword units or words de-
pending on the modeling choices. We will be using subword
units based on byte pair encoding in our experiments.
to distributions over texts A` : {0, 1}C → ∆(Σ∗)
which may depend on the LM `. Injectivity en-
sures that the stegotexts are unique decodable.
2.1 Near-imperceptibility
Instead of using the informal notion of impercep-
tibility common in steganography literature which
relies on a human eavesdropper (playing Eve)
judging the quality, we consider a formal statisti-
cal notion of near-imperceptibility. We say a mea-
sure over texts p, i.e. an LM, is δ-imperceptible
with respect to a language model ` if d(p, `) < δ.
This formalization is motivated by the fact that for
any algorithm, it takes at least Ω
(
1
δ2
)
-many sam-
ples to tell whether the samples come from ` or p
with high confidence.5 The smaller d(p, `) is, the
more samples are required for Eve to discover the
presence of our steganographic communication re-
gardless of her computational resource. Therefore,
we want to find encoding algorithms that are near-
imperceptible with respect to the true LM of the
monitored channel.
2.2 Decomposition of TVD
Suppose the true LM of the monitored channel is
`∗, and we have access to a base LM `, then run-
ning encoding algorithm A` induces an effective
LM A[`] := Eb[A`(b)]. Consider the TVD be-
tween the effective LM and the true LM
d(`∗,A[`]) ≤ d(`∗, `) + d(`,A[`])
by triangle inequality.
The first term on the right hand side corresponds
to how good our LM ` is, which is limited by the
advancement in LM research. The second term
is the gap due to our encoding algorithm and it
is the focus of this study. Without knowing how
large the first term is, we can still pursue a mean-
ingful relative imperceptibility guarantee of the
form, “it will be as hard to detect the presence
of the steganographic communication as detecting
the presence of `-fluent texts.”
We can further decompose the second term on
the right hand side over each generation step and
suppose s<t := s1 · · · st−1 is the prefix, we can
use Pinsker’s inequality (Tulsiani, 2014) and ad-
ditivity of KullbackLeibler divergence (KL diver-
gence)6 over product measures to obtain a bound
5This is a basic result from information theory. See for
example (Tulsiani, 2014).
6We will consistently compute KL divergence in base 2,
i.e. we measure entropy in bits.
via the KL divergence on each step
d(`,A[`])
≤
√√√√ ln 2
2
∞∑
t=1
DKL
(
P[·|s<t; `]
∣∣∣∣P[ · |s<t;A[`]]).
Hence in order to obtain relative near-
imperceptibility, it is sufficient to ensure that
at each generation step, the effective LM
P
[ · |s<t;A[`]] is close to the base LM P[·|s<t; `].
(See an analogous decomposition in terms of
per-step TVD in A.1.)
3 Analysis
Suppose h ∈ Σ∗ is a prefix (tokens generated up
to the current step), and the base LM is `.
3.1 Bins
Fang et al. (2017) divide the vocabulary into 2k
disjoint bins of equal sizes, {B1, · · · , B2k}, that
is, Σ = unionsq2ki=1Bi and |Bi| = V/2k. The parti-
tion is randomly chosen and shared between Alice
and Bob. Then we split a ciphertext into (C/k)-
many length-k blocks a1 · · · aC/k. We encode the
ciphertext by encoding each ai. To encode a ran-
dom block a ∼ Bernoulli(1/2)k, we pick a token
from the a-th bin, i.e. Ba, according to `. Suppose
s falls in the binBs, we effectively sample a token
s according to
P[s|h;Bins[`]] = 1
2k
P[s|h; `]
P[Bs|h; `]
and the KL divergence is
DKL(P[·|h; `]||P[·|h;Bins[`]]) = k −H(B).
(See A.3 for detailed derivation.) The last term
is the entropy of the partitions at the current step
which is bounded between zero and k. Hence, the
KL divergence is at most k at each step. How-
ever, if the probability mass is roughly evenly dis-
tributed over each of the 2k bins, then the KL di-
vergence is close to zero. This is the implicit as-
sumption about fluent texts Bins makes.
We empirically examine how well this assump-
tion holds. We use GPT-2-117M as the base LM
and sample from it 50 prefixes with 40 steps each,
saving 2K steps of conditional distributions. We
fix a randomly chosen partition of 23 = 8 bins.
The computed KL divergence concentrates in the
low-bit region with a second mode near 3 bit, the
maximum (Fig. 1). The mean of the distribution is
0.7 bits, meaning that in ten steps the KL bound
on TVD will be vacuous, encoding about 30 bits
of ciphertext.
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Figure 1: DKL(P[·|h; `]||P[·|h;Bins[`]]) in bits over
a sample of 2K tokens generated from GPT-2-117M
with 23 = 8 bins. Fewer tokens with high bits is better.
3.2 Variable-length coding (VLC)
Instead of using a fixed-length coding (one ste-
gotext token always encodes k bits in Bins),
VLC encodes one or more bits per generated to-
ken (Yang et al., 2018). VLC constructs a Huffman
coding of Σ at each step according to P[·|h; `].7
Then we sample a token from the constructed
Huffman tree c by following the bits in cipher-
text starting at the root, taking the left subtree
if the bit bi is zero else the right subtree until
reaching a leaf. The resulting Huffman distribu-
tion mc assigns probability mass 1/2r for a token
at depth r. Being a minimum redundancy code,
the corresponding Huffman distribution has the
minimum KL divergence among binary prefix-free
codes (Huffman, 1952) of at most 1 bit. But will
there be steps with large KL divergence like the
example “It is on top” in Sec. 1? We computed the
KL divergence of Huffman codes for the same 2K
samples (Fig. 2). The mean of 0.12 bits is signif-
icantly lower than Bins’s but it still has a second
mode near 1 bit, the maximum.
3.3 patient-Huffman
We improve VLC further by explicitly checking if
the TVD8 (or the KL divergence) between the base
LM distribution and the Huffman distribution is
small enough (Algorithm 1). If the TVD is greater
than a specified threshold at the current encoding
7This takes O(V log V ).
8Computing TVD or KL divergence is O(V ).
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Figure 2: DKL(P[·|h; `]||P[·|h;VLC[`]]) in bits over a
sample of 2K tokens generated from GPT-2-117M.
Fewer tokens with high bits is better.
step, instead of sampling from the Huffman distri-
bution, we sample from the base LM distribution
and patiently wait for another opportunity.
Clearly, this ensures that each step incurs no
more additional TVD than the specified threshold
δ. In principle, if we set δt = o(1/t) for the t-th
step, then we can bound the total TVD, guarantee-
ing the relative near-imperceptibility of the gener-
ated stegotext.
However, in practice, getting any meaningful
bounds (total TVD 1) will require setting very
small δt and this translates to an empirical assump-
tion that many fluent texts’ next token distributions
lie arbitrarily close to the Huffman distributions.
Examining Fig. 2, we see that there are many steps
Algorithm 1 patient-Huffman (one encoding step)
1: Input: a language model `, prefix h ∈ Σ∗, an
imperceptibility threshold δ, a ciphertext b.
2: Return: a stegotext from Σ∗.
3: Compute the distribution of the next token
p← P[·|h; `].
4: Construct a Huffman tree c for p.
5: Compute the TVD (or the KL divergence) be-
tween p and the corresponding Huffman dis-
tribution mc.
6: if TVD (or KL divergence) < δ then
7: Decode a tokenw by consuming the cipher-
text b and following its bits starting at the
root of Huffman tree c.
8: else
9: Sample a token w according to p.
10: end if
11: Append the token to prefix h← h;w
12: return h
with KL divergence close to zero. This assump-
tion, though more benign than VLC’s or Bins’s
empirically, is hard to establish theoretically for
fluent text.
4 Discussion
We focus on the encoding algorithm in our analy-
sis but it is not hard to see that Bob can correctly
decode the ciphertext from the stegotext by run-
ning the same algorithm with the same LM and the
same ciphertext block size (and other parameters
if any) as Alice, e.g. patient-Huffman with
the same threshold, and extract the unique (Huff-
man) code corresponding to the observed token as
ciphertext.
The generic approach of embedding a ciphertext
into a stegotext that has some anticipated distribu-
tion studied in this paper can very well apply to
other channels such as images or audios where we
can access the marginal distribution via a (deep)
generative model.
Formal notions of steganographic secrecy have
been studied in the cryptography community. In
particular, Hopper et al. (2008) develop a com-
plexity theoretic notion and characterize its neces-
sary conditions and its maximum bandwidth under
a perfect sampling oracle. This is stronger than our
setting where a trained LM provides us an approx-
imate access to the marginal distribution. The in-
formation theoretic notion of imperceptibility we
proposed independently is most similar to the no-
tion of steganographic security in (Cachin, 2004).
Further study connecting these results is needed.
Of particular interest is an extension called robust
steganography, where an active adversary may al-
ter messages, e.g. by injecting typographical er-
rors. The stegosystems studied here are vulnerable
to such attacks.
OpenAI’s decision of making GPT-2-117M
publicly available enables our empirical studies
and it likely will for other studies. However,
this released trained version is inferior to the full
GPT-2 model (Radford et al., 2019). While we
appreciate OpenAI’s general precaution and spe-
cific arguments against its release, we want to
note, with this work, that its release can also of-
fer social good by enhancing communication pri-
vacy. We advocate for the public release of strong
trained models as a way to mitigate the disparity in
access to both data and computational resources.
Lastly, the full implementation of the stegosys-
tem proposed in this work is made open-source un-
der a permissive license.9
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A Appendices
A.1 Basic facts about total variation distance
Over a countable space X and its discrete σ-
algebra P(X), TVD is related to the `1 metric,
d(p, q) = 12
∑
x∈X |p(x) − q(x)| = 12 ||p − q||1.
A few useful basic facts to recall are
• TVD is a metric, thus it obeys the triangle
inequality.
• TVD is upper bounded by Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergence via Pinsker’s inequal-
ity d(p, q) ≤
√
ln 2
2 DKL(p||q) where
DKL(p||q) := Ex
[
log2
p(x)
q(x)
]
is the KL di-
vergence measured in bits.
• TVD is sub-additive over product mea-
sures d(p1q1, p2q2) ≤ d(p1, p1) + d(q1, q2),
and relatedly, KL divergence is addi-
tive DKL(p1q1||p2q2) = DKL(p1||p2) +
DKL(q1||q2).
As an alternative to the upper bound due to KL
divergence, we can also bound TVD via its sub-
additivity under product measures
d(`,A[`]) ≤
∞∑
t=1
d
(
P[·|s<t; `],P
[ · |s<t;A[`]]) .
In fact, this can cover more general cases, such as
the analogous analysis of FLC (Yang et al., 2018)
which zeros out everything except for the most
likely tokens. We omit it due to page limit.
A.2 GPT-2 Language Model
The GPT-2 language model we used is a general
purpose language model from OpenAI trained on
WebText (Radford et al., 2019), which contains
millions of web pages covering diverse topics. Cit-
ing concerns of malicious use, OpenAI only pub-
licly released a small trained model with 117 mil-
lion parameters. And that is the particular lan-
guage model we use for empirical study in this
work, GPT-2-117M.
We choose to use GPT-2 as the base language
model in our work for several reasons. First,
GPT-2 is trained on a large amount of data that
we do not have access to. Second, it empiri-
cally achieves state-of-the-art performance across
seven challenging semantics tasks, which includes
question answering, reading comprehension, sum-
marization and translation. Third, its architec-
ture contains many late innovations such as trans-
former (Vaswani et al., 2017), instead of a recur-
rent neural network, and byte pair encoding for its
vocabulary (Sennrich et al., 2016).
A.3 Derivation of Sec. 3.1
The effective LM is equal to
P[s|h;Bins[`]]
By definition of Bins
= Ea
[
P[s|s ∈ Ba, h; `]
]
a are uniformly distributed with probability 1/2k
=
∑
a
1
2k
P[s|s ∈ Ba, h; `]
The bins are disjoint, s is only in Bs
=
1
2k
P[s|s ∈ Bs, h; `]
By definition of the marginal distribution
=
1
2k
P[s, s ∈ Bs|h; `]∑
s′∈Bs P[s′, s′ ∈ Bs|h; `]
=
1
2k
P[s|h; `]
P[Bs|h; `] . (1)
The KL divergence follows as
DKL(P[·|h; `]||P[·|h;Bins[`]])
=
∑
s
P[s|h; `] log2
P[s|h; `]
P[s|h;Bins[`]]
Substituting in (1)
=
∑
s
P[s|h; `] log2
(
2k P[Bs|h; `]
)
= k +
∑
s∈Σ
P[s|h; `] log2 P[Bs|h; `]
Σ is partitioned by B = {B1, · · · , B2k}
= k +
∑
a
∑
s∈Ba
P[s|h; `] log2 P[Ba|h; `]
= k +
∑
a
P[Ba|h; `] log2 P[Ba|h; `]
= k −H(B)
where H(B) is the entropy of the partition
{B1, · · · , B2k}.
